Regulatory Takings, Supernational Treatment, and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Issues Raised by Nongovernmental Organizations by Graham, Edward M.
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 31
Issue 3 Symposium 1998 Article 6
Regulatory Takings, Supernational Treatment, and
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Issues
Raised by Nongovernmental Organizations
Edward M. Graham
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell
International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Graham, Edward M. (1998) "Regulatory Takings, Supernational Treatment, and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Issues
Raised by Nongovernmental Organizations," Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 31: Iss. 3, Article 6.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol31/iss3/6
Regulatory Takings, Supernational
Treatment, and the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment: Issues
Raised by Nongovernmental
Organizations
Edward M. Graham*
Introduction
It was only during the 1990s that the world of international trade and
investment first seriously met with the world of the nongovernmental orga-
nizations (NGO). As first meetings go, it was not a happy one. The parties
discovered that legal principles designed primarily to facilitate unfettered
international movements of goods and services were not always compatible
with the goals of the NGOs. Although these latter goals were rather
diverse, they largely centered on one principle: the preservation of the
"global commons."
An item belonging to the global commons consists of virtually any
"good" held in common by the collective population of the planet where
private ownership is not feasible. The technical term is that the good is
"nonexclusive." Such goods include both tangible items, such as the air we
breathe, as well as abstractions such as "biological diversity" or "basic
human rights." Knowledge also falls into this category. For example, no
one owns the theorem of Pythagoras. Although these latter "goods" might
be abstractions, they have tangible impact on the quality of human life.
Society, at least in democratic nations, places positive value on both cate-
gories of goods.
To maximize societal value of these goods, one should neither assign
property rights to such goods nor trade them as if they are private com-
modities. Some goods might not be nonexclusive but society chooses by
law to make them so. In the case of human rights, for example, property
rights can be, and are, assigned: my rights are mine alone and not yours,
and vice versa. But such rights should not, for moral reasons, be traded in
a market. Society does not allow anyone to sell himself or herself into slav-
ery. The true public good is the collectivity of individual rights, and this
* Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC. The author wishes to
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collectivity is nonexclusive. In other words, such goods have the attribute
of being "public goods" as per the standard definition.
Some might object to calling basic human rights or preservation of
biodiversity "public goods" because such matters raise moral issues that
are beyond economic analysis. There are benefits to society at large in
upholding human rights or in preserving endangered species. Market
mechanisms cannot deliver these "untradable" benefits. Most economists
and NGOs would endorse this proposition. Economic analysis might fail
to define the value of these benefits. But the idea that these benefits do in
fact exist is at the heart of both analytic and moral judgments that value
does exist. 1
One characteristic of public goods is that they are free. One does not
pay for the air one breathes, for one's basic civil rights, or for the right to
use the Pythagorean theorem. The standard explanation for why these val-
uable goods are free is that they are "nonrival" goods. Use by one person
does not deplete the good; that is, there is no binding supply constraint on
the good. Alternatively expressed, satisfaction gained by one user of the
good does not diminish the satisfaction of others. Where this characteris-
tic breaks down - e.g., if the supply of breathable air is seriously
threatened by contamination - there will arise the need to regulate or con-
strain usage.2 Exactly how best to regulate such goods is subject to debate
within the legal and economic communities. One method might be to
assign quasi-property rights to these goods. For example, air pollution
might be kept within acceptable bounds if pollution rights were issued, the
total number of which would be set so as to keep contamination within
tolerable limits. These rights could then be traded, thereby allowing the
market to determine the most efficient use of such rights.
The earliest clash between NGOs and the world trading system took
place within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now the
World Trade Organization (WTO), over environmental protection issues.
The Earth Island Institute sued the U.S. Commerce Department, seeking to
ban importation of Mexican tuna caught by processes that, if used by U.S.
fishermen, would have been illegal under the Marine Mammal Protection
Act of 1972.3 This law requires the U.S. Secretary of Commerce to ban
tuna imports from countries that did not take steps to prevent the killing of
marine animals by tuna fishermen. The court held that the Commerce
Secretary violated the environmental protection law and ordered a ban on
1. The major disagreement between the economist and the environmentalist over
preservation of endangered species is largely one of valuation. Environmentalists often
place an unbounded (i.e., infinite) value on such preservation, whereas economists
point out that the value of everything, indeed human life itself, is subject to some upper
bound. The latter does not imply, however, that an economist would necessarily stand
shoulder-to-shoulder with a lobbyist for the oil industry who uses soft language to imply
that the objectives of the environmentalist have little or no societal value.
2. Contamination of a public good is an instance of an "external cost," i.e., a cost
that is created by an activity but that is not borne by the activity itself.
3. See Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 929 F. 2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991).
Vol. 31
1998 Regulatory Takings
Mexican tuna.4 Mexico then complained to the GATT. The GATT panel
sided with Mexico and held that the ban violated GATT Article 1I1. The
panel threw out U.S. claims that the ban was consistent with GATT Articles
XX.b and XX.c. This outcome angered leaders and constituents of environ-
mentally-oriented NGOs, convincing many that world trade law is antithet-
ical to environmental concerns, and that the goals of unfettered trade are
fundamentally incompatible with the goals of environmental preservation.
Many international trade experts felt that the GATT panel decision
exposed major weaknesses in GATT law. GATT law is designed to bring
about gains from international trade and investment, i.e., to generate bene-
fits. If there is some tradeoff between the benefits of trade (most of which
are realized privately by individuals) and those benefits associated with the
preservation of a public good, rationality would dictate that international
trade law should recognize the tradeoff. Most trade experts, however, saw
the weaknesses in world trade law as correctable rather than irreconcilable
incompatibilities between world trade and the preservation of the global
commons.
5
Some NGOs share this view. Indeed, a major rift amongst environ-
mentally-oriented NGOs emerged at the time of the debate over the passage
of the Act to Establish a North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) in late
1995 and early 1996. Certain NGOs argued that NAFTA should be
rejected because it would lead to further environmental degradation along
the U.S.-Mexico border. Other NGOs argued that NAFTA might actually
benefit the environment if certain rules and enforcement mechanisms were
created.
In 1997, a number of NGOs shifted their focus away from the WTO
and toward the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) and its negotiation of a new Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MAI). 6 At the time of this writing, the future of the MAI was highly uncer-
tain. If completed, the MAI would be binding upon all ratifying nations.
Although the OECD was the negotiating venue, participation in the MAI
was not limited to OECD member nations.
I. International Investments
Many NGOs opposed the MAI. The objections ranged from concerns that
international investment is associated with the inhumane exploitation of
labor in developing countries to concerns that certain provisions of the
MAI might vitiate environmental protection laws.
4. See id. at 1453.
5. Alas, no changes were made to the GATT in time to affect the 1998 ruling on the
shrimp problem. This case reinforced the panel decision on the earlier tuna case both in
terms of interpretation of existing WTO law and in terms of the anger it generated with
respect to the inability of this law to deal with a global commons issue.
6. See generally Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), The Multilateral Agreement
on Investment: The MAI Negotiating Text (last modified Dec. 14, 1998) <http://
www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/negtext.htn> [hereinafter MAI Negotiating Text].
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This Article disagrees with these objections. The claim that interna-
tional investment fosters inhumane treatment of workers is not supported
by empirical analysis.7 That is not to say that specific instances of such
exploitation do not exist. Countries that suppress the rights of workers to
organize labor unions are also preferred production sites for certain inter-
national corporations. In sectors such as footwear and apparel assembly,
these examples seem pervasive. In the aggregate, however, international
investment contributes to rising wages and improved standards of living in
host nations.
To ban international investment on grounds that it creates inhumane
treatment of workers is akin to banning the automobile because it causes
pollution, injury, and death - all of which are forms of societal costs that
adversely impact the global commons. But the automobile also brings tan-
gible benefits to individuals; otherwise, it would not be so ubiquitous.
What one is left with is a tradeoff between benefits and costs. About all
that the law can do is to maximize the benefits. For example, a regulation
that requires vehicles to be equipped with the best possible technologies
aims to improve safety and reduce emissions without imposing undue bur-
dens on the production costs. We do not require in the interests of safety
that every vehicle be armor plated.
Likewise, it would be irrational, and perhaps even cruel, if an effort
intended to prevent the use of child labor under sweatshop conditions also
blocked foreign direct investments that would elevate standards of living in
impoverished areas of the world. Empirical evidence suggests that benefi-
cial direct investments are far more prevalent than exploitative investments.
The same type of irrational fear of foreign direct investment exists
among environmentalists. Environmentalists typically argue that foreign
investors tend to seek "pollution haven" jurisdictions, where legal and
enforcement standards with respect to environmental issues are minimal.
They are concerned that especially dirty activities will concentrate in these
areas. Empirical evidence, however, shows that the overwhelming majority
of the world's direct investment is not located in pollution havens; rather, it
is concentrated in the high-income democracies and other jurisdictions
that tend to have the highest environmental standards.8 Also, the vast
majority of direct investment is in sectors that are not typically associated
with high rates of pollution. Furthermore, the typical international inves-
tor uses the latest and best technologies in overseas activities, which tend to
be the least polluting.
There is no doubt that there are many investments that raise valid
environmental concerns. 9 Pollution havens do exist and attract certain
investments. The point is not that the concerns about these investments
7. See generally Edward M. Graham, Trade and Investment at the WTO: Just Do It!, in
LAUNCHING NEw GLOBAL TRADE TALKs 205 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1998).
8. See Daniel C. Esty & Bradford S. Gentry, Foreign Investment, Globalisation, and
Environment, in GLOBALISATION AND ENVIRONMENT 141 (Tom Jones ed., 1997).
9. See, e.g., Peter Waldman, How Suharto's Circle and a Mining Firm Did So Well
Together, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1998, at Al.
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are invalid. Rather, it is that, to bring justice to the guilty, one surely would
not wish to hang the innocent.
II. Regulatory Takings
NGOs are especially worried that the investor protection provisions, when
used in conjunction with proposed dispute settlement procedures, might
be antithetical to a host nation's environmental protection laws. One inter-
pretation is that these provisions would treat a general class of governmen-
tal "regulatory takings" as expropriations. Under the MAI, expropriations
are not banned, but they must be carried out on a nondiscriminatory basis,
under due process of the law, for a public purpose, and with prompt and
adequate compensation in an internationally convertible currency.10
NGOs contend that any regulatory taking - i.e., any reduction in the value
of an asset or property - associated with the enforcement of environmen-
tal law could be interpreted as an expropriation and hence subject to com-
pensation. 1 NGOs argue that such an interpretation would effectively
nulify many environmental protection laws and regulations. Governments
might be reluctant to enforce such law and regulation because of budgetary
constraints.
The worries of the NGOs are bolstered by recent U.S. Supreme Court
decisions that place property development rights of individual property
holders 12 over the right of society to regulate land use for environmental
purposes without compensating the land owners. Thus, NGOs worry that
the U.S. takings doctrine could become the international norm via the
MAI.
This concern goes beyond the question of whether the MAI should
create a venue for international investors to seek compensation for regula-
tory takings. Also at issue is whether such an agreement should grant
international investors what amounts to "supernational" treatment, i.e.,
treatment that is more favorable to a foreign investor than a similarly-situ-
ated domestic investor. Because domestic laws usually do not require a
sovereign government to compensate a domestic investor for loss of asset
value resulting from a regulatory taking, if such a taking was deemed an
expropriation under the MAI, the MAI would grant supernational treat-
ment to an international investor.
These specific concerns can be easily remedied within the MAI. There
is no need to reject the MAI in its entirety to remedy specific deficiencies in
expropriation provisions.
This Part of this Article discusses the MAI's controversial language on
regulatory takings. It is not meant to be comprehensive in its coverage of
either the legal or the economic issues raised by regulatory takings.
Rather, this Part is meant to establish: (a) that the MAI language encom-
passes regulatory takings; (b) that compensation for such takings has a
10. See generally MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 6, art. IV(2).
11. Provisions similar to the MAI exist in NAFTA.
12. The term "property" in this instance means land.
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reasonable economic rationale; (c) that similar rationale can be offered for
other matters raised by multilateral trade law but are not subject to com-
pensation provisions; and (d) that domestic law generally does not provide
compensation for takings where the sovereign does not actually seize prop-
erty or assets.
A. Historical Background
A "taking" is defined as any governmental action that has the effect of
reducing the value of a private asset or property. The extreme case would
be an actual seizure of title to, or possession of, a tangible asset or property
by the government. Under the U.S. doctrine of eminent domain (similar
law exists in most OECD nations), such a seizure is permitted if it is done
for a public purpose. In most instances of eminent domain, the govern-
ment seizes private land and improvements to build roads, airports, and
other public infrastructure. Under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution, the government must pay an adequate compensation to the pri-
vate owner for the seizure.13
A less extreme example involves laws or regulations that reduce the
value of a private asset or property. The enforcement of such laws or regu-
lations will henceforth be termed a "regulatory taking" to distinguish it
from actual seizure by the government. The latter is sometimes termed a
"physical taking." 14
The scope of the Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause has changed over
time. During the early to mid-19th Century, courts consistently ruled that
the Fifth Amendment protection extends only to governmental seizures of
real property or tangible assets. 15 By the turn of the century, during the
so-called Lochner era, 16 the U.S. Supreme Court used a combination of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment to strike down a string
of legislative actions, including the income tax, minimum wage laws, and
labor laws. Under the Court's interpretation of these Amendments, virtu-
ally any change in the law or its application that altered property values,
including the values of intangible properties (such as expected earning
streams) could be construed as a taking of property. The Court's tactic
was to strike down such legislation on Fourteenth Amendment due process
13. The Fifth Amendment states: "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
14. Regulatory takings are to be distinguished from "physical invasions" of a prop-
erty by the government for a public purpose, e.g., the creation of an easement in a pri-
vate holding of land for purposes of creation of a common water or sewer line or
connection thereto. These are de facto physical takings (the land can be used only for
the purpose stated in the easement) but title remains with the original owner. Compen-
sation is typically deemed to be the benefit conferred on the owner by the service cre-
ated by the line.
15. Interestingly, in colonial times, some states did not necessarily require compen-
sation for physical takings, e.g., the taking of undeveloped land for construction of a
public roadway. See Myra Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation, Not a Lochean
Soliloquy, 26 ENvm. LJ. 1095 (1996).
16. The Lochner era is named after Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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grounds.17 The Lochner era was a period of judicial activism designed to
stem a tide of (socially) liberal economic legislation.
During the New Deal era, new appointments to the U.S. Supreme
Court ended the judicial activism and diminished the scope of takings.
Thereafter, the Court upheld most economic regulations even if compensa-
tion for regulatory taking was not provided. Since the 1980s, there has
been some reversion to the Lochner era regarding regulatory takings of real
property. 18 The new doctrine has generally not affected regulatory takings
other than those involving land use. This has caused some commentators
to suggest that there is now essentially a dual U.S. legal doctrine involving
regulatory takings: one for regulation of land usage and another for regula-
tion of all other forms of economic activity. 19 This new doctrine jeopar-
dizes some environmental protection laws, such as restrictions against
development in wetlands or beachfronts.20
B. Compensation for Regulatory Takings
When does a regulatory taking require compensation? The guiding princi-
ple, surviving from the Lochner era, seems to be a rule of "diminution of
value." Under this rule, not all regulatory takings result in automatic com-
pensation. The government is required to compensate the property owner
only where the taking action "goes too far" in terms of reducing the value
of the asset or property.2 1 To paraphrase Justice Holmes, the government
could scarcely function if it had to compensate owners of assets or proper-
ties every time a new provision is added to law, or an old one struck from
law.22 Thus, the "too far" rule is meant to provide a balance between the
17. The Court often indicated that the legislation as struck down would pose no
Constitutional issue had such compensation been available. The Court was rather selec-
tive in what legislation it struck down. See generally Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Loch-
ner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REv. 605
(1996).
18. Restrictions on building in wetlands and coastal areas are examples of such
regulations.
19. See McUsic, supra note 17.
20. See id.
21. The "diminution of value" rule dates to a 1922 U.S. Supreme Court decision that
held that the government can regulate the use of private property without compensa-
tion, to prevent harm, unless the regulation "goes too far" in reducing the value of the
property. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). However, no clear defini-
tion was provided to establish when in fact the regulation had gone "too far." It is a
commonly held belief that the 1922 ruling broke new ground in suggesting that a regula-
tion could go too far. Prior to that time, most regulatory takings cases were treated
under the "noxious use" or "harm" doctrine that held that there was no taking if a regu-
lation controlled uses of assets or properties that were injurious to the heath, morals, or
safety of the community. Note that during the Lochner era, in order to qualify under the
harm doctrine, a regulation had to pass two considerably high hurdles. The first is a
"means/end" test to determine whether the regulation would accomplish its stated pur-
pose of preventing harm. The second is a "cause/effect" test to determine whether a
party that suffered a loss of property value actually caused the harm that the regulation
was attempting to avert.
22. See id. at 413.
Cornell International Law Journal
government's ability to govern effectively and the right of citizens to be
protected from governmental excesses.
U.S. law does not provide a clear test to determine when the threshold
of "too far" has been crossed. Given this vagueness, treatment of regulatory
taking has not been wholly consistent. U.S. trial courts have awarded com-
pensation even though compensation was denied in previous cases with
similar circumstances. Likewise, U.S. appellate courts have awarded com-
pensations that differ from that of the lower courts even though both are
applying the same rule to the same set of facts.23
The diminution of value rule can be criticized on purely economic
grounds. There are two main arguments against the rule. First, because
the "too far" test applies only to compensating the private costs of regula-
tion without considering what might be the public benefits of this regula-
tion, a government might fail to regulate against inappropriate uses of
property. Second, the lack of compensation can lead to overzealous or
excessive regulation.
Either of these arguments could lead to an inefficient economic out-
come if an element of "moral hazard"2 4 is introduced. A full review of the
economic implications is beyond the scope of this article, but several obser-
vations pertinent to the MAI are noted in the following paragraphs. 25
Suppose the government suffers from what is commonly termed "fis-
cal illusion." That is, the government sees the costs and benefits of its
actions as equal to the fiscal outlays or revenues produced by these actions.
It is well established that the fiscal costs and benefits of a governmental
action often deviate significantly from the true costs and benefits to soci-
ety. Hence, "fiscal illusion" is likely to create outcomes that are sub-opti-
mal to societal interests. The Gramm-Rudman requirement that subjects
international trade agreements with the U.S. Government to fiscal tests
demonstrates this illusion. For example, an increase in tariffs resulting in
increased revenues to the Treasury would be seen as a benefit, even though
standard economic analysis indicates that this increase often results in a
net cost to U.S. society.
When a government is under fiscal illusion, it might fail to apply a
regulation when the regulation produces a net social gain. That is, if the
23. See generally RiciHAR A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 1 passim (1985) (discussing a legal history of takings). More recent
cases are cited in Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Regulatory Takings: When
Should Compensation Be Paid?, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 749 (1994); McUsic, supra note 17. In
particular, Miceli and Segerson discuss the economics of the 1992 Supreme Court rul-
ing in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The ruling, in the eyes of
some analysts, creates a new precedent in the compensation for a regulatory taking and
thus establishes the "new doctrine" described in the text.
24. Discussed infra.
25. See generally Lawrence Blume et al., The Taking of Land: When Should Compensa-
tion Be Paid?, 99 HA~v. QJ. EcoN. 71 (1984); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of
Legal Transitions, 99 HAnv. L. REV. 509 (1986); WILLIAM A. FIsCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF
ZONING LAws (1985); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and
Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of Just Compensation, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 269 (1988).
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total benefits to society exceeded the total costs, the fiscal illusion would
prevent the government from recognizing this benefit at all. Similarly, the
NGOs worry that if the MAI were to allow foreign investors to seek com-
pensation for regulatory takings, then governments would be reluctant to
pass or enforce regulations, even if they create net benefits for the preserva-
tion of public goods.
The fiscal illusion problem would be eliminated if governments are
able to use a full cost/benefit analysis when deciding whether to enforce
the regulation. If so, compensation for regulatory takings would be effi-
cient; only those regulations that create net social benefits would be imple-
mented. Such compensation would also be just. The community should
compensate individuals for their losses if the community chooses to inflict
losses upon specific individuals.
An important qualification must be added because it bears especially
on the MAI: If full compensation for private losses is required, then the
issue of "moral hazard" should be taken into account. Moral hazard arises
when property holders view compensation as a form of insurance against
future regulatory takings. These property holders tend to overdevelop their
properties, i.e., they would invest more than they would in the absence of
compensation, because they know that there is a significant probability of
future regulation.
For example, suppose that a risk-neutral investor would receive $100
from property development if there were no future regulations but would
receive nothing if future regulations were enacted. Suppose further, that
the actual cost of property development is zero, but the investor must pay
for the right to undertake this development in the absence of regulations.
If regulation is enacted, it renders the right null and void. Finally, suppose
that the investor estimates the probability of future regulation to be fifty
percent.
If there were no compensation offered in the event of regulation, the
investor would be willing to pay up to the expected value of the return - in
this example, $50 - for the right to develop the property. However, if full
compensation were allowed, this same investor would be willing to pay as
much as $100. The moral hazard created by the insurance causes the
investor to overinvest by as much as $50.
In this case, it might be argued that compensation should be limited to
$50, which represents the expected return to development given the risk of
regulation without insurance. Yet, even this would lead to moral hazard
and overinvestment; the investor would now be willing to pay $75 for the
development right. Even so, it might be argued that the owner should be
compensated for the uninsured, expected value of the property if the regu-
lation were actually in effect. However, calculation of the "moral hazard"
premium - the difference between what the investor would pay for the
right to develop with or without full compensation in the event that the
value of the developed property is reduced because of regulation - is not
as easy as this example suggests. The example was premised on the inves-
tor having linear (i.e., risk-neutral) preferences towards uncertainty. Had
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the investor been risk-averse, as is the normal case, the maximum amount
that he or she would have been willing to pay for the right to develop would
have been less than the $50 expected value of the payoff. Also, it is difficult
to assess the probabilities of the contingencies (in the example, the contin-
gency is whether or not regulation would take place) in the absence of a
well developed market for contingent claims. Indeed, the payoff to develop-
ment in the event that no regulation takes place might be subject to consid-
erable uncertainty. In short, where an efficient level of investment in
property development is straightforward to describe in theory, it often is
not so easy to calculate in practice.
Also, the cost/benefit analysis itself is easier to apply in the abstract
than in reality. In most instances, a significant component of total cost or
total benefit is likely to be "external" in nature and hence not easily mea-
sured. The transaction costs of performing the analysis are also likely to be
substantial. Transaction costs, including costs of adjudication, are not lim-
ited to compensation based on cost/benefit analysis. Any approach to
compensation for regulatory takings is likely to have significant transac-
tion costs. Such costs must be included as part of the calculus of whether
compensation leads to an economically efficient outcome.
Moral hazards and transaction costs show that compensation for regu-
latory takings does not result in efficient outcomes, even if the government
applies a cost/benefit analysis to determine what regulations to apply.
Moral hazard can be reduced if compensation is based on estimates of
costs to individuals in the absence of insurance. While various schemes
for such a reduction have been proposed, without accurate and objective
valuation, any such scheme could be challenged as to the value of the esti-
mation and hence increase transaction costs.26
Many economists worry that if governments act under fiscal illusion
and, under the diminution of value rule, are not required to compensate for
the loss of property value as the result of a regulatory taking, governments
will regulate zealously. This is so because the costs of regulation will be
perceived as zero, and regulation will be undertaken whenever it is per-
ceived to be beneficial. In the strictest sense, this would occur only if the
regulation were to produce revenue for the government. For example, dur-
ing the 19th century, the U.S. government zealously regulated interna-
tional trade via tariffs because it relied upon the tariff as its major source of
revenue. In a classic work, Harvard economist Frank Taussig showed that
the welfare costs of this reliance - resulting in a rather extreme form of
fiscal illusion - were enormous to the United States.27
It is even more problematic if governments suffer from some form of
asymmetrical fiscal illusion. For example, a government might only treat
direct fiscal costs as costs of regulation and anything that pleases a vocal
constituency view as a benefit. Under these circumstances, applying the
26. The author, who is not a lawyer, cannot resist adding that this would likely cre-
ate a new gold mine for the legal profession.
27. See generally FRANK W. TAUSSIG, THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1 pas-
sim (1892).
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diminution of value rule to compensate only in exceptional cases would
likely result in significant overregulation. This is so because most regula-
tion would then be seen as costless and hence would be pursued if there is
any perceived benefit. The regulation is excessive in the sense that it would
lead to an inefficient outcome because real costs would be ignored.
Il. MAI's Investment Protection Provisions
The specific language of the draft MAI that raises concerns about potential
treatment of takings is contained in Article IV(2.1):
2.1 A Contracting Party shall not expropriate or nationalise directly or
indirectly an investment in its territory of an investor of another Contracting
Party or take any measure or measures having equivalent effect (hereinafter
referred to as "expropriation") except:
a. for a purpose which is in the public interest,
b. on a nondiscriminatory basis,
c. in accordance with due process of law, and
d. accompanied by payment of prompt, adequate and effective com-
pensation in accordance with Articles 2.2 to 2.5 below.28
The phrase "measures having equivalent effect," combined with the
adjective "indirectly," would make it easier for an international investor to
allege regulatory taking. To expropriate or nationalize "directly" would
seem to imply physical taking. However, if to expropriate or nationalize
"indirectly" is interpreted to mean that some portion of the value of an
asset passes to public ownership, even if actual title to the asset or property
remains in private hands, then a regulatory taking could reasonably be
interpreted as a measure "having the equivalent effect" of such an indirect
nationalization. In other words, the phrasing of the provision is suffi-
ciently ambiguous that a regulatory taking could be interpreted as an "indi-
rect" expropriation or nationalization. In this event, an international
investor who suffers a loss of property value could lodge a claim against
the state under the MAI, if any of the four qualifying exceptions to article
IV(2.1) are not met. If successful, the investor would be entitled to prompt
and adequate compensation.
The MAI does not balance the right of governments to govern against
the right of property holders to be protected from overzealous regulation.
Indeed, the MAI's language could give rise to a taking claim even in cases
where the government is acting to prevent harm. If this language does
apply to regulatory taking, then the MAI, in effect, establishes a strict com-
pensation rule, whereby such takings must be compensated regardless of
circumstances.
Under such an interpretation, strict compensation would exacerbate
the aforementioned moral hazard problem. If the MAI is interpreted to
mean that compensation must be offered for regulatory taking, then such
compensation would be tantamount to mandatory insurance in favor of
investors against the risk of regulations. As previously discussed, this
28. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 6, art. IV(2.1).
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would lead to overinvestment in such projects. This overinvestment prob-
lem could be especially serious for nations that currently have lax labor or
environmental standards.
Provisions in Articles IV(2.2) through IV(2.5) of the MAI increase the
risk of a moral hazard. These provisions clarify terms on which compensa-
tion must be offered:
2.2 Compensation shall be paid without delay.
2.3 Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expro-
priated investment immediately before the expropriation occurred.
The fair market value shall not reflect any change in value occurring
because the expropriation had become publicly known earlier.
2.4 Compensation shall be fully realisable and freely transferable.
2.5 [Compensation shall include interest a commercial rate established on
a market basis for the currency of payment from the date of expropria-
tion until the date of actual payment.] (Note: the brackets indicate that
this language was not agreed by all negotiating parties.)2 9
Article 2.3 seems to suggest that compensation must be offered at the
full value of the investment prior to public knowledge of the new regula-
tion. The problem with this provision is that it would have the effect of
insuring the investor against the risk that an internationally acceptable
standard would be implemented.
Notwithstanding the fact that empirical evidence shows that most
international investors do not flock either to "pollution-haven" nations or
to nations with lax labor standards, some foreign direct investments, how-
ever, do take place in these countries. By encouraging overinvestment in
such countries' labor-intensive or pollution-intensive industries, the MAI
expropriation provisions would only serve to worsen the current problem.
The MAI establishes a standard that is more "friendly" to plaintiffs
than the standard established under U.S. takings doctrine. Thus, under
the MAI, foreign investors would be granted "supernational" treatment
because they would have recourse to compensation not available to U.S.
investors under comparable circumstances.
Although there are arguments both for and against compensation for
regulatory takings, there are equally compelling arguments for compensat-
ing other categories of losses resulting from international commercial
transactions where international law does not mandate such compensa-
tion. The very opening of an economy to international trade alters the
value of the human capital in that economy. Yet, when trade liberalization
causes owners of human capital to suffer losses, no world trade laws com-
pensate these owners.
To be sure, recourse to compensation is provided under GATT article
XXIX (also known as the "escape clause"), whereby temporary relief may
be granted to activities that suffered "material injury" due to implementa-
tion of WTO obligations by member nations. Arguably, the possibility of
compensation is also provided under GATT article VI, whereby exporters
29. Id. art. IV(2.2)-(2.5).
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of "dumped" goods may be subject to tariff-like fines to equalize the mar-
gins of dumping where domestic producers of like goods suffered "mate-
rial injury." As with the diminution of value rule, the rules underlying the
implementation of these two articles can also be criticized on economic
grounds for producing inefficiencies. 30 These rules have spotty coverage.
Some individuals who suffer losses resulting from liberal trade are com-
pensated while others receive no compensation at all. Also, unlike the
MAI, these WTO articles do not provide international arbitral venues for
gaining compensation. Rather, compensation must be sought via a
national government operating within the context of the WTO rules.
Foreign investors would be in an uniquely priviliged category if the
MAI provides them with compensation for losses resulting from regulatory
takings. Unlike most other categories of property holders who suffer
losses from the regulation (or deregulation) of international commerce but
are not entitled to compensation, international investors who are covered
by MAI rules would be so entitled under virtually all circumstances. One
can reasonably wonder why one category of asset holders should be enti-
tled to such a unique privilege. Most of the same arguments advanced in
favor of regulatory takings compensation on efficiency grounds apply
equally to workers whose skills are devalued by changes in trade policy.
MAI negotiators recognized some of the problems associated with the
regulatory taking provision under the MAI draft. At meetings held in early
1998, negotiators expressed views that MAI signatory governments were
not meant to be required to pay compensation for losses which an investor
or investment may incur through regulation, revenue raising, and other
measures of general application taken by governments, and that laws estab-
lishing taxation measures, environmental or labour standards, or intellectual
property regimes, are not intended to constitute expropriation for the pur-
poses of the MAT31
Accordingly, the MAI negotiation committee chairman proposed changes
to the MAI draft in March of 1998.32 Furthermore, the OECD declared
that "the MAI would establish mutually beneficial rules which would not
inhibit the normal non-discriminatory exercise of regulatory powers by
governments[.]" 33
The current MAI draft, however, has failed to incorporate any of these
changes. This failure might be a good thing because the OECD language
would provide a complete carveout for regulatory takings. This provision
is analogous to going from one extreme to another. There might be circum-
stances wherein one would want the expropriation provisions of the MAI to
30. This is especially so regarding antidumping. Most analysis suggests that the
result is overcompensation in a form that unduly penalizes users of the goods.
31. Correspondence from Pierre Poret, Principal Administrator of Directorate for
Fiscal, Financial, and Enterprise Affairs, OECD, to author.
32. See OECD, Environment and Labour in the MAI: Chairman's Proposals (visited
Mar. 15, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/labeenv.htm>.
33. OECD Ministerial Conference on Electronic Commerce, Oct. 7-9, 1998.
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cover a regulatory taking, for example, where the intended effects of seem-
ingly routine regulation were in fact discriminatory.
The history of investor protection provisions in international agree-
ments indicates that their main purpose is the protection of foreign inves-
tors from discrimination by the host nation. U.S. negotiators recognize the
importance of this protection, given that foreign investors have no recourse
to an impartial judicial or corrective system. U.S. negotiators are especially
worried about developing nations that expropriate U.S. investments with-
out compensating subsidiaries of U.S. based corporations. 34 Such expro-
priations, or "forced divestitures," amount to physical takings.
In the late 1970s, the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
entered into bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with developing nations.
By providing for international arbitration of compensation disputes, force-
ful investment protection provisions in the BITs helped eliminate discrimi-
nation against U.S. investors abroad.
The investor protection provisions of the MAI are modeled after the
BITs. Although useful in bilateral agreements, the utility of including such
provisions is unclear in the case of a multilateral agreement, such as the
MAI, which would be drafted and entered into by advanced nations with
developed legal systems that provide protection to foreign investors. The
judicial asymmetry that necessitates the investor protection provisions of
the BITs does not exist in a multilateral agreement like the MAI.
If investor protection provisions cover regulatory takings, then interna-
tional investors would gain the privilege of seeking claims for all regulatory
takings. These privileges, however, are likely to arouse domestic resent-
ment because foreign investors will be treated more favorably than nation-
als. A backlash of isolationism and mercantilism could follow.
A multilateral agreement should strive to achieve a minimal standard
for investor protection that is consistent with internationally recognized
standards, national treatment (i.e., non-discrimination), and due process.
Investor protection provisions should not force a government to grant for-
eign investors compensation for regulatory takings beyond the level of
compensation available to domestic investors. The current investor protec-
tion provisions of the MAI should therefore apply to physical takings only.
However, where a host nation applies its regulations in a highly dis-
criminatory manner so as to create a de facto expropriation of a foreign
asset or a significant diminution of this asset, the MAI should include a
new provision that would protect the investor. As a safeguard against over-
zealous invocation of this provision, the MAI should require that an inter-
national tribunal find that the regulation is significantly prejudicial against
the investor (i.e., that national treatment had been denied) or that due pro-
cess of law had been denied. Absent such findings, the complaint should
not be covered by the investor protection provisions.
34. See FRED C. BERGSTEN E r AL., AMmCAN MULTINATIONALS AND AMERICAN INTERESTS
385-95 (1978).
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Conclusion
On October 14, 1998, after the preceding sections of this Article had been
submitted to this Journal, French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin announced
that France would pull out of the MAI negotiations because of continuing
irresolution of issues pertaining to cultural industries and unbound reser-
vations. Most observers felt, however, that the pullout actually stemmed
fromJospin's need to placate his Socialist-Communist coalition to maintain
his party's "cohabitation" with the rightist presidency of Jacques Chirac.
The Socialist-Communist coalition vocally opposed the MAI, whereas
Chirac's constituencies seemed indifferent to the fate of the MAI. On Octo-
ber 20, 1998, OECD Deputy Secretary General Joanna Shelton announced
that, while there remained a consensus among OECD member nations on
the need for a multilateral framework on investment in spite of the French
pullout, negotiations on the MAI would resume as scheduled.
Should the negotiations never resume, the NGOs can take credit for
stopping the MAI. The NGOs consistently maintained that the MAI would
harm the environment. French leftists echoed this concern. As noted in
this Article, it is not at all clear that the MAI would have the deleterious
effects on the environment as the NGO critics claim. The MAI contains
provisions similar to that of the NAFTA. And, contrary to the NGOs' asser-
tion, multinational firms have not used these provisions as the basis for a
wholesale attack on laws and policies designed to protect the environment
in NAFTA nations. Even the pro-corporation outcome of the Ethyl case has
not to date provoked a rash of similar cases, as environmentalists have
feared it would. These provisions, however, grant foreign investors
recourse to takings procedures that are unavailable to domestic investors
under the NAFTA or OECD. Possibly the most objectionable aspect of the
MAI is this supernational treatment of foreign investors.
But it is also clear that OECD governments recognized this objection
and were prepared to modify the MA!'s expropriation provisions so that
they would not apply to most takings. Indeed, when MAI negotiations were
suspended in May of 1998, several negotiating parties (including the U.S.
government) had signaled a willingness to amend the MAI to protect envi-
ronmental and labor interests. To be sure, other issues remained
unresolved, but such lack of resolution is typical of international negotia-
tions. For example, some issues under negotiation during the Uruguay
Round remained unresolved even as the final agreement was signed and
came into force. These issues later became the core of the current WTO
"built-in agenda." Traditionally, negotiations of multilateral trade agree-
ments would take unresolved issues off the table so that these issues would
not derail the whole train. Thus, if the MAI negotiations do end in com-
plete failure, it will be unprecedented in the history of post-World War II
multilateral trade negotiations.
The cause and effect of this failure is beyond the scope of this Article.
About all that can be said is that the NGOs might have won a Pyrrhic
victory in this instance, given that the MAI might have addressed many of
their concerns. As matters stand, few of their concerns are addressed in
614 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 31
current WTO law. Moreover, failure of the MAI could render trade negotia-
tions more suspicious of NGOs. These negotiations often perceive NGO
goals as being the "upset the apple cart" variety rather than ensuring that
the apples are safe to eat.
If nothing else, the MAI negotiations demonstrate that when the world
of the NGOs meets the world of trade negotiations, the outcome is less
than constructive. If the MAI does in fact fail, it is probable that the same
issues will arise again in future WTO negotiations. One would hope that,
by then, these two worlds will have learned how to deal with each other to
reach a better outcome.
